Compliance, Enforcement, and Risk Management Posts
During its meeting in New York City on October 18 and 19, the ALI Council reviewed drafts for seven Institute projects. Drafts or portions of drafts for six projects received Council approval, subject to the meeting discussion and to the usual prerogative to make nonsubstantive editorial improvements.
Reputation risk is a material peril of economic harm from angry disappointed stakeholders. It is the gap between those stakeholders’ expectations and the reality of their experience with any given entity.
Technology is rapidly disrupting every industry and institution around the globe. Yet, corporate compliance has remained relatively unaffected by technological change when compared to other industries.
Kitty Holt, ethics and compliance officer at Plan International USA, and Ray Justice, senior director of compliance operations and awards at Plan International USA, talk to The Wall Street Journal about how nonprofit organizations operate without all the resources available to big corporations and the compliance challenges of working with project partners.
Corporate Criminal Enforcement in the United States: Using Negotiated Settlements to Turn Potential Corporate Criminals into Corporate CopsJennifer H. Arlen
Corporate criminal enforcement in the United States differs from other countries in three ways. First, the United States can impose criminal liability on corporations in a broader range of cases than other countries. Second, almost all corporate criminal resolutions involving large firms take the form of negotiated settlements. Third, the United States grants prosecutors both more choices and more discretion when resolving criminal cases: prosecutors can enter into guilty pleas or pre-trial diversion agreements (deferred and non-prosecution agreements).
A Personality Theory of Sophisticated Investor Decision-Making (In the 2008 Financial Crisis), with Some Policy ImplicationsClaire A. Hill
This paper argues that a nuanced view of sophisticated investors, as well as sellers and structurers of financial instruments, articulated within a rationality paradigm, has implications for financial regulation.
This paper begins a larger project – to develop a principled basis for characterizing what does and does not constitute bad corporate behavior.